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Summary: While a bulk of economic theoretical and empirical research deals
with various aspects of financial liberalisation, there is far less research de-
voted to the measurement of financial liberalisation. In this paper we calculate
an index of financial liberalisation in 18 transition countries in the Central, East-
ern and South-East Europe (CESE) and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). This index was previously developed in works of Aaditya Mattoo
(1999) to measure financial liberalisation that the WTO member countries have
committed to. We make a slight modification to scaling to take into account the 
specific aspects of CESE and CIS countries and also apply the index to a non-
WTO member (Serbia) using its currently applied regime. In this paper we will
examine the influence of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
framework on liberalisation commitments in financial services sector in the
target countries.
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This paper discusses the level and the scope of financial liberalisation in 17 World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Central, Eastern and South-East Europe (CESE) and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member countries. This heterogeneous 
group of countries includes central European EU accession countries on one side to 
small central Asian countries on the other side of the spectrum. These countries are 
Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Macedonia FYR, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia. Some were already GATT members (Czech and Slovak Re-
publics, Hungary, Poland, Romania and ex-Yugoslavia) but most were not. Today all 
of the countries in the group, except Serbia, are WTO members and four countries 
are OECD members: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic.  
We also examine the financial services’ commitments to the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (GATS) of the 17 CESE and CIS countries that are WTO 
members. We also calculate liberalisation indices for banking and insurance sectors 
using methodology developed in Aaditya Mattoo (1999). The results of the financial 
services liberalisation analysis are considered against the GATS framework as an 
indication of the countries’ real level of liberalisation and financial sector develop-
ment. Based on these findings we try to assess the role of GATS in the countries’ 
financial services reform. 
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1. The General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) 
 
GATS was negotiated during the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) and is the first and 
only set of multilateral legally-enforceable rules that govern international trade in 
services of 149 country-members. Similar to the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT), GATS encompasses the following three elements: general rules and 
disciplines, Annexes to regulate sector specificities and the Schedule of Specific 
Commitments that show specific obligations a particular Member has undertaken in 
the particular service sector. Unlike GATT, GATS has a specific fourth element: List 
of Article II (MFN) exemptions. This list shows the sectors in which the Member is 
temporarily not going to apply the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) principle of non-
discrimination legally-enforceable rules that govern international trade in services of 
149 country-members. Many countries have made use of this exemption: the EU for 
audio visual services, non-life insurance and canal transportation, the US for finan-
cial services and pipeline transportation and most OECD countries for air-
transportation. 
The generally accepted definition of trade in services, as provided in Article I, 
Paragraph 2 of the GATS, recognizes this specific aspect of services and defines 
trade in services by way of four services supply modes:  
 
  Mode 1: Cross-border Supply – The services are delivered across the coun-
try border, the service provider resides abroad while the consumer remains 
in the home country, similar to trade in goods (e.g., when financial credit is 
extended or insurance policy purchased from a bank/insurance company 
located abroad); 
  Mode 2: Consumption Abroad - The consumer travels into the country in 
which the services are delivered by the foreign services supplier (e.g., ob-
taining financial services when travelling abroad); 
  Mode 3: Commercial Presence - Service supplier of one country supplies a 
service in another country by establishing, through foreign investment, a 
commercial presence in that country (e.g., commercial presence of foreign 
banks or insurance companies); 
  Mode 4: Presence of Natural Persons - This applies to the temporary 
movement of individuals (which are natural, not legal persons as is the 
case in the previous mode) and arises when a service is delivered in a for-
eign market; these individuals may be independent service providers (such 
as consultants), or foreign employees of a service-supply company (e.g., 
solicitation on domestic territory of insurance products by agents from a 
foreign country, foreign manager of a domestically-established bank). 
 
According to Rudolf Adlung and Martin Roy (2005), the estimates of the Sta-
tistical Division of the WTO Secretariat are that mode 3 (commercial presence) has 
more than 50% share of total service trade value, while mode 1 (cross-border supply) 
and mode 2 (consumption abroad) account for 30% and 15% of the total value of 
service trade.  
Due to the specific nature of services and the consequent definition of services 
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of tariff protection. The application of the GATS is not confined to product-related 
measures, as provided for under the GATT, but covers producer-related laws and 
regulations as well, as discussed in Adlung and Roy (2005). Counterbalancing its 
broader coverage in terms of economic transactions and permissible policy measures, 
GATS allows use of virtually any conceivable trade instrument (from supply quotas 
to discriminatory subsidies).  
The level of the foreign trade in services liberalisation is weighed against the 
restrictions of Market Access (MA) or National Treatment (NT) for each of the four 
service supply modes and for every service sector. Concrete liberalisation commit-
ments of a WTO member country, defined against this framework, are entered into 
that country’s Schedule of Specific Commitments (the Schedule) related to GATS, 
through which it commits to a particular level of liberalisation in trade in services. 
The MA and NT commitments are scheduled applying the positive listing approach. 
Only those sectors specifically listed are covered by the liberalising provisions in the 
Schedule.  
We have examined WTO commitments in financial services in 17 CESE and 
CIS countries that are WTO members. This analysis encompasses the following fi-
nancial service sectors:  
 
i.  Insurance and insurance related services, i.e. (i) to (iv) according to the An-
nex 5.(a); 
ii.  Banking services, which comprise sub-sectors (v) to (ix) in 5.(a) of the An-
nex; and 
iii.  Other financial services (securities, money broking asset management etc), 
or sub-sectors (x) to (xvi) of the Annex 5(a). 
 
Only the first three modes of supply, cross-border, consumption abroad, and 
commercial presence, were taken into account. Limitations to mode 4 (movement of 
natural persons) are based on different set of regulations and the scope of mode 4 is not 
at all significant for the financial services sector. Residency requirements for employ-
ees and management bodies that were listed as mode 3 limitations in some Schedules 
were not taken into account either. 
 
2. Numerical Evaluation of the Financial Services’ Liberalisation 
Scope 
 
The commitments in the banking and insurance sectors summarized in Table 1 were 
used to calculate the liberalisation indices in financial services sector. This was per-
formed using the methodology that was first developed by Mattoo (1999) and conse-
quently applied in a number of studies, such as Mattoo, Randeep Rathindran, and 
Arvind Subramanian (2001), Alexei Kireyev (2002), Ramkishen S. Rajan and Gra-
ham Bird (2002), Rajan and Rahul Sen (2002), Phillipp Harms, Aaditya Mattoo, and 
Ludger Schuknecht (2003), and Li-Gang Liu (2005).  
The commitments are analyzed for 18 countries, which include Serbia and 17 
other countries previously mentioned. Information on limitations applicable for each 
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with the above analysis and in accordance with the model set out in Mattoo (1999). 
Regarding Serbia, since it is not a WTO member (hence does not have a Schedule) 
the liberalisation indices were calculated on the basis of its currently applied regula-
tory regime. On one hand, this means that without changing the current regime, Ser-
bia cannot have a higher liberalisation index. On the other hand, it is possible and 
quite probable that during negotiations for accession Serbia would be expected to 
commit to a higher level of liberalisation compared to the current regime, meaning 
that the WTO membership would result in a higher liberalisation index (effectuated 
by the appropriate regulatory change). In short, results for Serbia would not be di-
rectly comparable to those of the other countries if the currently applied regime in 





The liberalisation index created by Mattoo, and used in this research, belongs to a class 
of frequency measures of a degree of services liberalisation. These measures were 
originally constructed simply to reflect the frequency of appearance of commitments in 
the WTO Schedules and have since evolved in two directions. These are: (1) creation 
of sophisticated scales of restrictiveness to capture different types of restrictions and to 
provide adequate measure of the level of restrictiveness of each (sector-specific) meas-
ure; and (2) development of different weighing schemes to form an adequate aggregate 
measure. 
One of the first researches to develop a sophisticated frequency measure for fi-
nancial services sector is that of Mattoo (1999). He created a liberalisation index, sepa-
rately for banking and insurance sectors, which runs in the interval [0,1]. The index is 
calculated based upon the WTO commitments by identifying the most restrictive 
measure by mode of supply and by service sub-sector. Each measure is then assigned a 
restrictiveness score, according to a restrictiveness scale that was developed to capture 
the specificities of both the observed sectors and the country pool. Each restrictiveness 
score is then weighted, using weights to capture the relative importance of a particular 
mode of supply of a particular sub-sector, to obtain a sector-specific aggregate measure 
dubbed the liberalisation index. 
The scope of analysis is limited to two sub-sectors of direct insurance: life in-
surance and non-life insurance, and two sub-sectors in banking: acceptance of depos-
its and other repayable funds from the public (acceptance of deposits), and lending of 
all types including consumer credit, mortgage credit, factoring and financing of com-
mercial transactions (lending).  
In our analysis, the most restrictive measure for each of the 17 WTO members 
can be found in Table 1. The restrictiveness scale, based on the model provided by 
Mattoo, was developed to reflect the specific features of the WTO commitments of the 
CESE and CIS countries. The situation where there are no restrictions on a particular 
service or mode of supply is considered the situation of full liberalisation and the 
score value is 1. If no commitments were taken for the studied service and supply 
mode, the score value is 0. Between these two extremes there are many levels of 
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many countries impose restrictions on legal form of entry—e.g., it is required that a 
domestic entity be founded (no business can be conducted through affiliate offices) 
and the appropriate score value is 0.75. 
After we assigned the restrictiveness score for each of the two types of ser-
vices and for each of the three supply modes investigated, what we needed was a 
suitable means (e.g., weighting scheme) to aggregate the data.  
The weighting scheme, which is supposed to define the relative significance of 
each of the studied service categories, was calculated based on USA foreign trade 
data. While the restrictiveness scale we developed (see Table 1) is somewhat different 
to that of Mattoo, the modal weights are the same as the ones employed by this re-
search. Both of these are described in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1   Modal Weights and Restrictiveness for Calculation of the Mattoo Index of Liberalisation in 




Modal weights in insurance and banking 
 
  Cross-border supply  Consumption abroad  Commercial presence 
Insurance:     
Life  0.12 0.03 0.85 
Non-life  0.20 0.05 0.75 
Banking:     
Deposits  0.12 0.03 0.85 
Lending  0.20 0.05 0.75 
 





Modes 1 and 2  Mode 3 
0.00  No, or virtually no commitment  No commitment, or virtually no commitment 
0.10  -  No new entry or unbound for new entry 
0.25  -  Discretionary licensing or economic needs testing for new entry  
0.25  - Reciprocity  condition 
0.50  Partial liberalisation  Exemption of certain sub-sectors (e.g., exclusive suppliers) 
0.75  -  Limitation on the legal form of entry 
0.75  -  Other minor limitations 
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3. Results of Application 
 
Mattoo liberalisation indices calculated as explained above run in the interval [0,1], 
where 0 represents the particular sub-sector being fully closed and 1 represents full 
liberalisation on all modes of supply. By aggregating the scores using the modal 
weights, we have calculated four separate liberalisation indices for two groups of in-
surance services: life insurance and non-life insurance, and for two groups of bank-
ing services: acceptance of deposits and lending. We have applied the approach to the 
information on commitments in 17 countries in Table 2 in the Appendix and on the 
information on the Serbian applied regulatory regime. The results are presented in Ta-
ble 3 in the Appendix. Here we have ranked the countries according to their total liber-
alisation level, so that the first country, Estonia, has the most liberal, and the last coun-
try, Hungary, the least liberal WTO regime for trade in financial services.  
Serbian index calculated upon its current applied regime is listed last and is the 
lowest. Serbia maintains significant limitations on cross-border transactions (no life 
insurance, almost no non-life insurance as well as no bank-deposits abroad). In addi-
tion, it has discretionary licensing requirements for establishing a bank or an insurance 
company. The main reason for this is the reluctance on the part of the government to 
liberalise these sectors further on the arguments of the unfinished financial regulatory 
reform, weak oversight structures and incomplete privatization of the sector.  
Finally, using the two indices for each sector, we calculated a simple average 
for insurance services and for banking services. This result is outlined in Figure 1, 
where countries are ranked by their date of accession to the WTO such that the left-
most countries, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovak Republic, Poland and 
Slovenia, are the original members, followed by Bulgaria (which acceded in 1996, 
but submitted its Schedule in 1997), and ending with Macedonia as the country that 
among the WTO members acceded last. On the right end of the figure is Serbia 





Source: Authors’ calculations based on the methodology developed in Mattoo (1999). 
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As previously discussed, CESE and CIS countries have much more liberal 
commitments in mode 3 (commercial presence) than in modes 1 and 2. When analyz-
ing the results in Table 3 and Figure 1, it is important to bear in mind that mode 3 
also has the highest impact in the calculation of the Mattoo liberalisation index. For 
that reason the penalty impact of MFN exemption in case of Hungary was a very low 
liberalisation score. They are joined by Serbia which has discretionary licensing pro-
cedures for establishing foreign commercial presence. 
The results listed in Table 3 in the Appendix show that at the bottom of the ta-
ble, with the lowest liberalisation scores, are only the original WTO members and 
Bulgaria which joined only one year after (plus Macedonia which has pre-committed 
to future liberalisation in 2008, when its score will be in the upper half of the table). 
The newly acceded WTO members including all CIS countries are at the top of Table 
3. This finding, that the newly acceded members have a higher liberalisation score, is 
more obvious in Figure 1, where countries were ranked by the date of WTO mem-
bership. 
The fact that the lowest scored are the original WTO members and also the 
most developed countries in the pool, clearly points to the possibility that actually 
applied regulatory regime in those countries may be more liberal than their GATS 
commitment (autonomous liberalisation). As Table 3 and Figure 1 show, OECD and 
EU member-countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic are 
among the lowest-ranked. Yet those countries have liberalised their policies in order 
to achieve OECD and EU requirements. This conclusion is in accord with the find-
ings of Felix Eschenbach and Bernard Hoekman (2006), who analyzed the overall 
GATS commitments of CESE and CIS countries and the EU commitments and com-
pared their GATS commitments to the actually applied policies in the service sector 
as a whole. They find that all countries that had the prospect of accession to the EU 
apply much higher overall level of services liberalisation than the level they commit-
ted to in GATS. In our analysis of the financial services sector this result applies only 
to the countries that were the original members. Countries that only recently acceded 
to the WTO (which precedes EU accession) and soon after became EU members 
have already committed to a high liberalisation level in financial services in GATS. 
The highest financial services liberalisation indices in Table 3 are those of two 
EU member countries (since 2004): Estonia and Lithuania. These are followed by 
three CIS countries: Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. The country’s size and/or the 
size of the financial markets also play an important part in the decision to liberalise. 
Asli Demirguc-Kunt (2006) finds that small financial systems tend to under-perform 
since they “fall short of minimum efficient scale and have much to gain from liberal-
ising and sourcing some of their financial services from abroad.” All the countries 
with the highest financial services’ liberalisation index in Table 3 fall in this cate-
gory. This may partially explain why their governments were willing to accept such 
high level of commitment in financial services. 
On the other hand, many of those countries may have regretted accepting a 
high level of commitment. We found that in the special session of the Council for 
Trade in Services on March 6, 2003, newly acceded WTO members including Alba-
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“undertaken major liberalisation efforts in their WTO accession processes and had 
little or no margins for further flexibility” (International Centre for Trade and Sus-
tainable Development 2003). This also underlines the fact that the WTO structure 
and accession negotiation procedure demands increasingly higher levels of commit-
ments from the prospective members. Furthermore, Eschenbach and Hoekman 
(2006) find that in five countries, namely Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova 
and FYR Macedonia, the actual applied regime in all service sectors is less liberal 
than their GATS commitments.  
Eschenbach and Hoekman (2006) also compared CESE and CIS country rank-
ings according to the GATS commitment index (for total services) and according to 
the EBRD Services Reform Index (EBRD Index), which measures the success of 
overall services policy reform. While ranking according the GATS commitment in-
dex for all services is similar to our ranking of financial services in Table 3, the rank-
ing according to the EBRD Index is almost reversed. Here Hungary has the highest 
score, followed by Poland, Estonia, Czech Republic and Slovenia. The EBRD index 
is lowest for Kyrgyzstan, followed by Georgia, Moldova and Armenia, which are all 
CIS countries that fare among highest in our financial services sector liberalisation 




In this paper we have examined liberalisation commitments of WTO member coun-
tries in CESE and CIS in financial services sector. We conclude that of the three fi-
nancial services sectors, insurance, banking and others (securities), banking is the 
most liberal sector according to the WTO commitments, which is also the most de-
veloped of the three financial services sectors in CESE and CIS countries. The level 
of commitment seems to be lowest for insurance sector, where a few countries 
schedule exclusive provision of mandatory insurance schemes in mode 3, and only 
one allows cross-border life insurance services.  
While all countries have achieved a high level of liberalisation in mode 3 
(commercial presence) except for Hungary, Slovenia and Serbia, most of them main-
tain some level of capital mobility limitations and modes 1 and 2 are more restricted. 
Liberal scores on mode 3 especially in banking signal the countries’ recognition of 
the positive role foreign banks may play in domestic financial system and find that to 
be an important vehicle for achieving internal competitiveness. However, fewer 
countries were willing to allow cross-border branching (whereby achieving full liber-
alisation in mode 3). This signals that these countries may not be willing to commit 
to a higher level of external exposure. However, for some countries that are 
OECD/EU members, the actual level of liberalisation is higher than their GATS 
commitments. In other CESE countries, this is an indication that the financial ser-
vices industries are still relatively under-developed and wish to establish internal 
competitiveness before being exposed to international competition.  
Compared to the newly-acceded countries, the original WTO members have 
committed to a far lower level of liberalisation in financial services. However, the 
actually observed policies are often more liberal then the GATS commitments in the 
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presents an important drawback for GATS which in its successive negotiation rounds 
still proves to be unable to capture this liberalisation level. In fact, at one point it was 
hoped that “a nice outcome in services would be one in which members bind 
autonomous liberalisation which they have carried out since the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations a decade ago” (from interview of Amb. Fer-
nando de Mateo y Venturini, Chairperson for services negotiations, in Washington 
Trade Daily, 2/13/07).  
On the other hand, quite a few newly-acceded members, who faced much 
higher accession requirements, have problems in applying the level of liberalisation 
they committed to in the WTO GATS. Some of them may even have actual policies 
that undermine their GATS commitments. Over-protective prudential measures is 
one possible explanation for the applied regime in financial services to be more re-
strictive than the respective GATS commitment. The GATS Annex on Financial Ser-
vices provides for the prudential carve-out, that is prudential regulations are allowed 
for financial services sector and need not be scheduled. Furthermore, bearing in mind 
that the GATS framework does not provide for the definition of prudential regula-
tions (except that they should be “justifiable”), it stands to reason that in a specific 
country they may be defined in such a way as to significantly impair GATS com-
mitments in financial services sector. One of the future directions for financial ser-
vices sector liberalisation at global and individual country level should be develop-
ment of international standards and rules regarding prudential regulations, in order to 
further identify their scope, define what constitutes “justifiable” prudential measures 
and limit their derogatory impact on financial services trade. While the issue of 
autonomous liberalisation has been widely discussed and is at core of the current ne-
gotiations, there are only few mentions of the issues of prudential regulations in this 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2   Liberalisation Commitments in Financial Services for CESE and CIS Countries 
 
Country Insurance Banking Other  (securities etc.) 
Albania  Mode 1  Full commitment only for marine and aviation 
transport insurance; reinsurance and retro-
cession.  
No commitment. No commitment (until 
development of appr. 
prudential regulation, 2010 
at the latest). 
   Mode 2  Full commitment. Limitations on capital outflow (until 
2010 at the latest). 
Limitations on capital 
outflow (until 2010 at the 
latest). 
   Mode 3  Full commitment. Full commitment. Full commitment.
Armenia  Mode 1 Full commitment only for marine and aviation 
transport insurance; reinsurance and retro-
cession.  
Full commitment. No commitment.
   Mode 2 Full commitment. Full commitment. Full commitment.
   Mode 3 Full commitment. Full commitment. Foreign branches 
may not provide deposit services. 
Full commitment.
Bulgaria   Mode 1 Significant limitations including those on 
capital movement. 
No commitment. No commitment.
   Mode 2 Significant limitations including those on 
capital movement. 
No commitment. No commitment.
   Mode 3 Foreign entry only through participation in 
the existing insurance companies or author-
ized branches. Exclusive providers of man-
datory non-life insurance. 
Limitation on legal form of entry. Limitation on legal form of 
entry. 
Croatia  Mode 1 Full commitment only for marine and aviation 
transport insurance; reinsurance and retro-
cession.  
Full commitment except for accep-
tance of deposits.  
No commitment for trading, 
and underwriting and issue 
of securities. 
   Mode 2 Full commitment only for marine and aviation 
transport insurance; reinsurance and retro-
cession 
Capital mobility limitations. Capital mobility limitations. 
   Mode 3 Full commitment. Full commitment. Full commitment.
Czech Re-
public 
Mode 1 No commitment. No commitment for deposit services, 
payments and trade in foreign ex-
change assets. Otherwise full com-
mitment.  
No commitment for partici-
pation in issue of securi-
ties, asset management, 
settlement & clearing and 
trading transferable securi-
ties. 
   Mode 2 No commitment for life insurance of perma-
nent residents, insurance of property and 
liability for loss and damage on domestic 
territory. 
No commitment for deposit and 
mortgage loan services. Otherwise 
mostly full commitment.  
No commitment for asset 
management, otherwise 
mostly full commitment. 
   Mode 3 Limitations on legal form of entry and exclu-
sive providers of compulsory motor third 
party liability. 
Limitations on legal form of entry. 
Branches allowed. 
Limitations on legal form of 
entry. 
Estonia  Mode 1 Full commitment. No commitment for deposit services. 
Otherwise full commitment. 
Full commitment.
   Mode 2 Full commitment. Full commitment. Full commitment.
   Mode 3 Full commitment. Full commitment. Full commitment.
Georgia  Mode 1 No commitment for life and non-life except 
for international transport regarding imports 
to Georgia. Full commitment for reinsurance 
and retrocession.  
Full commitment. Full commitment.
   Mode 2 Full commitment. Full commitment. Full commitment.
   Mode 3 Full commitment. Full commitment. Full commitment.
Hungary  Mode 1 Full commitment only for marine and aviation 
transport insurance; reinsurance and retro-
cession. 
No commitment. No commitment.
   Mode 2 Full commitment only for marine and aviation 
transport insurance; reinsurance and retro-
cession.  
No commitment. No commitment.
   Mode 3 MFN exemption (reciprocity condition). MFN  exemption  (reciprocity condition). MFN exemption (reciprocity 
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Country   Insurance Banking Other  (securities etc.) 
Kyrgyzstan Mode 1  No commitment, except for insurance of 
cargo transportation, brokerage and reinsur-
ance. 
Full commitment. Full commitment.
   Mode 2  Full commitment. Full commitment. Full commitment.
   Mode 3  Full commitment. Full commitment. Full commitment.
Latvia  Mode 1  No commitment except for reinsurance. No commitment. No commitment.
   Mode 2  Full commitment. Full commitment. Full commitment.
   Mode 3  Full commitment. Full commitment. Full commitment.
Lithuania Mode 1  Full commitment only for marine and aviation 
transport insurance; reinsurance and retro-
cession.  
Full commitment. Full commitment.
   Mode 2  Full commitment. Full commitment. Full commitment.
   Mode 3  Full commitment. Full commitment. Full commitment.
Macedonia, 
FYR 
Mode 1  Full commitment only for marine and aviation 
transport insurance; insurance of commer-
cially licensed transportation vehicles; and 
reinsurance and retrocession.  
No commitment. No commitment.
   Mode 2  Full commitment only for marine and aviation 
transport insurance; insurance of commer-
cially licensed transportation vehicles; and 
reinsurance and retrocession  
Full commitment except for deposit 
services which will be liberalised upon 
phase II of Stabilisation and Associa-
tion Agreement (SAA).  
No commitment, full com-
mitment will be awarded 
gradually to trading, with 
the application of SAA with 
the EU. 
   Mode 3  Limitation on legal form of entry, branches 
allowed from 2008. 
Limitation on legal form of entry. 
Branches allowed from 2008. 
Limitations on legal form of 
entry. 
Moldova  Mode 1  Full commitment only for marine and aviation 
transport insurance; reinsurance and retro-
cession.  
No commitment No commitment.
   Mode 2  Full commitment. Full commitment except that outgoing 
capital transactions require approval. 
Full commitment except 
that outgoing capital 
transactions require ap-
proval. 
   Mode 3  Full commitment. Limitations on legal form of entry & 
branches. 
Limitations on legal form of 
entry. 
Poland  Mode 1  Full commitment only for reinsurance and 
retrocession and goods in international 
transport.  
No commitment. No commitment.
   Mode 2  Full commitment only for reinsurance and 
retrocession and goods in international 
transport.  
No commitment. No commitment.
   Mode 3  Limitations on legal form of entry. Branches 
allowed. 
Limitations on legal form of entry. 
Branches allowed. 
Limitations on legal form of 
entry. Branches allowed. 
Romania  Mode 1  No commitment except for reinsurance of the 
part of the risk that cannot be placed on 
domestic market. 
Full commitment except for payments 
where no commitment. 
No commitment.
   Mode 2  No commitment except that ceding reinsur-
ance on international market allowed for 
reinsured risk that cannot be placed on 
domestic market.  
Only with the National Bank permis-
sion. 
No commitment.
   Mode 3  Allowed only as a joint venture with a do-
mestic person 




Mode 1  No commitment for life insurance of perma-
nent residents, insurance of property and 
liability for loss and damage on domestic 
territory and air and maritime insurance. 
Otherwise full commitment. 
No commitment for deposit services, 
payments and trade in foreign ex-
change assets. Capital mobility 
limitations. 
No commitment for partici-
pation in issue of securi-
ties, asset management, 
settlement & clearing 
services and trading 
transferable securities. 
   Mode 2  No commitment for life insurance of perma-
nent residents, insurance of property and 
liability for loss and damage on domestic 
territory. Otherwise full commitment. 
No commitment for deposit services. 
Capital mobility limitations. 
No commitment for asset 
management. Capital 
mobility limitations. 
   Mode 3  Limitations on legal form of entry and exclu-
sive providers of mandatory insurance 
schemes. 
Limitations on legal form of entry. 
Branches allowed. 
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Country Insurance Banking Other  (securities etc.) 
Slovenia  Mode 1 Full commitment for marine and aviation 
transport insurance and goods in interna-
tional transit. Otherwise no commitment. 
No commitment. Only inbound credit, 
guarantees and commitments allowed, 
except for consumer credits (to be 
allowed upon acceptance of new 
Law).  
No commitment.
   Mode 2 Full commitment for marine and aviation 
transport insurance; goods in international 
transit and reinsurance and retrocession of 
the part of the risk that cannot be placed on 
domestic market (to be abolished upon 
adoption of new Law). Otherwise no com-
mitment. 
No commitment.  No commitment.
   Mode 3 Only as a joint venture with domestic entities 
and upon approval. Maximum foreign own-
ership 99% (to be abolished upon adoption 
of new Law). No commitment for privatiza-
tion. 
Potential discretionary licensing for 
foreign participation. No branches. Will 
be liberalised upon adoption of new 
Law.  No commitment on privatization.
Limitations on legal form of 
entry.  
 
Note:    
No commitment – market closed (although in effect it may be open, the country did not make any obligation to keep it so); 
Full commitments – fully open market 
Mode 1 – cross border trade,  
Mode 2 – consumption abroad,  
Mode 3 – commercial presence 























                                                        
1 The analysis was performed as background research for the calculation of the liberalisation indices in 
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Table 3   Liberalisation Indices for Direct Insurance and Banking in CESE and CIS  
 









insurance  Acceptance of deposits  All types of loans 
Estonia EU  1999,  13-Nov  1.00  1.00  0.88  1.00 
Lithuania EU  2001,  31-May  0.88  0.90 1.00  1.00 
Georgia -  2000,  14-Jun  0.88  0.80  1.00  1.00 
Kyrgyzstan -  1998,  20-Dec  0.88  0.80  1.00  1.00 
Armenia -  2003,  5-Feb  0.88  0.90  0.79  1.00 
Croatia -  2000,  30-Nov  0.85  0.88  0.85 0.98 
Albania -  2000,  8-Sep  0.88  0.90  0.87 0.78 
Latvia EU  1999,  10-Feb  0.88  0.80  0.88 0.80 
Moldova -  2001,  26-Jul  0.88  0.90  0.67  0.61 
Romania EU  1995,  1-Jan  0.64  0.56 0.99  0.98 
Poland OECD,  EU  1995,  1-Jul  0.85  0.75  0.64  0.56 
Macedonia, FYR  -  2003,  4-Apr  0.64  0.69  0.64  0.61 
Slovenia EU  1995,  30-Jul  0.64  0.69 0.43  0.63 
Bulgaria EU  1996,  1-Dec  0.64  0.48  0.64  0.56 
Slovak  
Republic  OECD, EU  1995,  1-Jan  0.43  0.50  0.64  0.69 
Czech  
Republic  OECD, EU  1995,  1-Jan  0.44  0.40  0.64  0.81 
Hungary OECD,  EU  1995,  1-Jan  0.21  0.31  0.21  0.19 
Serbia  -  not a member  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.29 
 
Note: Higher levels of index indicate higher liberalisation commitments  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the methodology developed in Mattoo (1999).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 